DICK PHILIP K.: (1928-1982) American Writer of Science Fiction, considered a master of dystopian ...

DICK PHILIP K.: (1928-1982) American Writer of Science Fiction, considered a master of dystopian fiction. A lengthy, interesting T.L.S., love, Phil (with a love heart and arrow drawn in his hand alongside his signature), three pages (separate leaves), 4to, n.p. (Santa Ana, California), 13th January 1981, to Professor Patricia Warrick. Dick commences his letter announcing that he is 'Elated at finding what seems to be an explanation for my March 1974 experience I have been reflecting on the subject of monism (in view of the fact that my explanation is that I saw a monistic world such as Spinoza describes, as I discuss in my two previous letters). Now what I've been pondering is: What value, if any, would the thought of the first great monist in philosophical history have for me; that is, Parmenides? I always sensed that Parmenides' thought was crucial in explaining March 1974 but I could not apply it. I mention Parmenides in VALIS, as you know, and my 'Two-Source Cosmology' is based on his metaphysics' and continues to explain 'In my recent letters I mention what I call the macrometasomakosmos, but I do not explain it, since I was copying from my notes. This is my neologism for a changeless morphologically-arranged world that I saw; it seemed to be conceptual (hence morphologically-arranged); the world we normally see, which I call the flux world, as Heraclitus called it, feeds into this macrometasomakosmos new accretions that cause what I call the phylogons (which are the eide or Forms within this eternal structure or kosmos) to reticulate and arborize, as in a memory system that is being perfected, made more complex and completed. I could not figure out for years where this macrometasomakosmos is; then very recently I realized that it is our world but seen correctly; that is, in terms of four spatial axes rather than three spatial axes plus time; in other words, time is converted into the fourth spatial axis (as I keep saying in VALIS, 'Here time turns into space'). So I regard this permanent macrometasomakosmos not as a separate world from our own-as Plato's Form world is from the flux world-but as this world correctly seen, so instead of having two worlds as with Plato I have one world: I) Seen incorrectly as continually passing out of existence, which is our flux world. II) Seen correctly as eternal, with new accretions constantly added to it, but conceptually arranged; that is, the macrometasomakosmos is not static; it grows and perfects and completes itself, but it is permanent. The phylogons are permanent. This realm is a marvelous structure and is obviously the kosmos that Pythagoras envisioned (he used the term 'kosmos' in a very unusual way; it is worth researching his meaning; basically he used the term to mean 'the harmonious fitting-together of the beautiful' and he believed that the kosmos is alive). I am now of the opinion that to see our world correctly as the macrometasomakosmos is to see a monistic world. Although I got the idea from Spinoza I at once turned to Parmenides; he believed that the world-order truly (correctly) seen was a monistic world in which there was no change; he opposed this to the flux world that our percept system reports. (I know you know all this, but I am laying out the basis here for my own conclusions, so forgive me.) Now, Parmenides explained the problem this way: the world-order is made up of a dialectical interaction between Form One and Form Two, which resemble respectively Yang and Yin of Taoism. However, as I mention in VALIS, Parmenides believed that Form Two was only seeing; it just seemed to exist; men believed wrongly that it existed. So what he called the 'dry soul' which had no Form two in it could apprehend the world under the aspect of Form One alone) based on the premise of like-to-like; what you are subjectively is what you will experience externally, a rather sophisticated doctrine for such an early period in history). Dick returns to his experiences of March 1974, Now, I have talked for years about what I call a 'second signal' that I saw added to the reality that we normally see; this, I mean, in March 1974. Something that is normally missing-but which exists; it is missing only in that we do not perceive it-got perceived by me. In my two previous letters I conclude that this 'second signal' is the other attribute of natura sive substantia………But, when I reflect on Parmenides, I wonder if it is not possible that I saw this other attribute of substantia -the sole element that constitutes reality-because I was able to filter out Parmenides' Form Two. I did see the macrometasomakosmos and it did fit Parmenides' description of the unchanging eternal monistic world (which frankly never occurred to me before!). Now, bear in mind that Plato's entire system of metaphysics was developed to answer Parmenides' belief that there is nothing veridical in the empirical world at all; as I said in an earlier letter, Plato was determined to restore some reality to the empirical world-hence his strange concept of 'the semireal, ' which, I think, may have been a faulty solution. Would it not have been much better to say: 'The flux world is the eternal world incorrectly perceived'? rather than saying: 'There are two worlds, the flux world which is mere reflection, and the Form world which is real.' The problem could have been solved by this method and you would not then have had to posit two worlds; more important, the flux world that our senses report could have been conceived a priori as being real but simply not adequately perceived-reported-by our sense…but this is virtually what Parmenides said, and this is what Plato objected to. I am convinced, at this point, that when I saw Valis, the plasmate and the macrometasomakosmos I was seeing this world, the one world, correctly; and, what is more, I comprehended the dialectic, this perhaps indicating that I did indeed see what Parmenides spoke of, inasmuch as he believed in the dialectic. I have, frankly, never really been able to figure out what the dialectic is between, who and who, what and what; all I comprehend was that one side of it is wiser than the other; one, the superior one, possesses absolute a priori knowledge, and thereby it perpetually wins. Well, this is in essence a short, simple description of Parmenides' Forms One and Two, with Form One the superior form. What I am really saying is that perhaps via Spinoza I am now seeing a pay-off of my studying of the pre-Socratics. Here is Pythagoras' kosmos; here is Parmenides' monistic permanent unchanging world as well as his dialectic; here, most of all (and this is the highest virtue in my system) what my beloved authority on the pre-Socratics Edward Hussey says is the chief virtue of Greek naturalist speculation: "The core of the Milesian revolution, namely, the development of a reformed theology based on general principles, and the correlative vision of a universe governed by universal law, cannot be paralleled, as yet, from anywhere outside Ionia. The earlier Hebrew prophets, and the Iranian prophet Zoroaster, may have had a vision of the nature of God as austere as that of Xenophanes, but their expression of it is enmeshed in the particular circumstances of themselves and their society. And because they lack such a vision, the cosmogonies of Babylonia, Canaan, or Egypt contain intelligent speculations and inferences, as well as the general notion of an established world-order, but are unable to free themselves definitely from the entrenched belief in the arbitrary power of an uncoordinated multiplicity of gods, and their world-systems evolve in a sequence of events without any internal necessity." (Italics mine.) To me, this is the virtue of philosophy and the defect of religion; I mean, however sublime Christianity or Judaism or Zoroastrianism are, they contain this arbitrary will of the god which is 'mysterious, ' meaning, 'It can never be understood, ' whereas with the Greek naturalists: "…they supposed, equally with some support from observed facts, that the universe, being controlled by a supreme divinity worthy of the name, must necessarily be universe or order, of lawlike regularity, and of intellectually satisfying construction. To hold this belief inevitably inclines men to be naively optimistic and to underrate the subtlety of nature. Their constructions are doomed always to turn out crude by comparison with reality." Dick concludes his letter writing But is not the effort noble? Is this not what we should try for? If I can explain March 1974 in terms of Parmenides and Spinoza it is a victory not just for my intellect but for man's inquiring intellect in general. I do not wish to write it off simply by saying, "It is the mysterious unknowable workings of God." Had I been content to do that, this exegesis would never have been begun. I could have said in March 1974, "It is a miracle!" and left it that. I am sure you understand my effort and my search, and my faith in human reason.' Accompanied by the original envelope. About EX